Overview: proxima·red provides zero-knowledge tools for passwords and notes. By default, all content is encrypted in your browser using AES-256-GCM before any content leaves your device. For encrypted content, the server receives ciphertext and the metadata described below. The encryption key is either embedded in the URL fragment (share links) or derived entirely client-side and never transmitted (authenticated vault). The one exception is the note tool's explicit plain-text link option, which stores the note unencrypted (see Section 3.5). No analytics tools, tracking pixels, or third-party scripts are embedded. All assets (fonts, scripts, styles) are served from my VPS in Nuremberg, Germany.
Controller
The controller within the meaning of Art. 4(7) GDPR is:
Dominic M. Quaiser
Jahnstraße 60
09126 Chemnitz
Germany
E-Mail signal@proxima.red
There is no designated Data Protection Officer (DPO). The controller is directly reachable via the contact details above.
Scope
This policy covers proxima.red, pass.proxima.red, and note.proxima.red, including password sharing, static and collaboratively editable note links, registered user accounts, and the authenticated password and note vaults.
Data Processed
3.1 Server Access Logs
What: When any page is loaded, the web server automatically records standard HTTP access log data. This typically includes:
- IP address of the requesting device
- Date and time of the request (timestamp)
- HTTP method, requested URL path, and protocol version
- HTTP response status code and bytes transferred
- Referrer URL (if transmitted by the browser)
- User-Agent string (browser name, version, operating system)
Who processes it: The controller operates the web server and application on a VPS provided by netcup GmbH in Nuremberg, Germany. Access and error logs are generated by the server software and container runtime and are accessible to the controller. Netcup provides the underlying infrastructure as described in Section 05.
Purpose: Ensuring stable and secure operation — detecting attacks, abuse prevention, and fault diagnosis.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interests. The legitimate interest is the secure and reliable provision of the service.
Retention: No fixed automatic deletion period is currently configured for application and web-server logs. They remain until removed through log rotation or deletion on the VPS. Separately, Netcup may collect infrastructure logs to defend against attacks and states that these are retained for a maximum of 14 days; see its log storage policy.
3.2 Session Cookie — Authenticated Users Only
What: Upon successful sign-in, Django sets a single session cookie named
sessionid. This cookie contains an opaque random token that links the browser
to the server-side session record. The session record stores:
- The authenticated user's internal numeric user ID
- A flag confirming successful authentication
- Separate vault access deadlines and identifiers for invalidating sessions after a password change
No personal name, e-mail address, or plaintext secret is stored in the session.
Attributes: HttpOnly · Secure (HTTPS) · SameSite=Lax · max-age seven days. The cookie is not set for visitors who do not sign in.
Purpose: Maintaining the authenticated session so the user can access the vault without re-authenticating on every request.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR — processing is necessary for the performance of the service contract with the user (providing authenticated access to the vault). Under § 25(2) Nr. 2 TDDDG, no separate consent is required for cookies that are strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user; a session authentication cookie meets this criterion.
Retention: Password vault access expires 30 minutes after password verification, even during use. Note vault access expires after seven days without note activity. Foreground note activity renews the note deadline and the shared session cookie; background status checks do not. Signing out invalidates both vaults. Expired session records are purged by Django's session cleanup mechanism.
3.3 CSRF Token Cookie
What: Django sets a CSRF cookie (csrftoken) on all pages that
include forms. It holds a random token used to verify that state-changing POST requests
originate from this site and not a third-party page (cross-site request forgery protection).
Attributes: HttpOnly in production · Secure (HTTPS) · SameSite=Lax. JavaScript obtains the request token from the page's hidden form field.
Purpose: Security mechanism required by the web framework to prevent CSRF attacks.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interests (technical security of the service). Under § 25(2) Nr. 2 TDDDG, no consent is required; the CSRF cookie is strictly necessary for the secure operation of a service explicitly requested by the user.
Retention: Up to 364 days from the last time the cookie is set or refreshed, using the configured CSRF cookie lifetime.
3.4 Anonymous Password Shares
What: When a visitor creates a password share without an account, the server stores in the database:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
id |
Randomly generated UUID identifying the share |
encrypted_data |
AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the secret (Base64) |
iv |
Initialization vector used for encryption (Base64) |
encrypted_title |
AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the optional title (Base64), if provided |
title_iv |
IV for the title ciphertext (Base64), if provided |
created_at |
Timestamp of creation |
expires_at |
Expiry timestamp (1 hour · 1 day · 1 week · 4 weeks — chosen by the creator) |
access_count |
Number of times the share was retrieved |
created_by |
NULL (no account linked) |
The encryption key is never transmitted to the server. It is embedded solely in the URL
fragment (#), which browsers do not include in HTTP requests.
Purpose: Providing the password-sharing service.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interests. The legitimate interest is providing the password-sharing service as explicitly requested by the user. No account or contract exists for anonymous shares; the user initiates the transaction voluntarily and the server processes only what is technically necessary to fulfil that specific request.
Retention: Each share is automatically deleted when its expiry timestamp is
reached. A background job (delete_expired) runs every minute in production. A
share is also deleted immediately when it is accessed after its expiry time. The maximum
retention period is 4 weeks.
3.5 Shared Notes
Text written or imported into the public note editor is kept in the browser until you create a share link. Saving a note to the authenticated vault sends encrypted content as described in Section 3.10.
What: When a visitor shares a note, the server stores in the database:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
id |
Randomly generated UUID identifying the note |
content |
AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the note (Base64) — or, for a plain-text link, the unencrypted note text |
iv |
Initialization vector used for encryption (Base64); empty for plain-text notes |
is_encrypted |
Whether the note was encrypted in the browser |
created_at |
Timestamp of creation |
expires_at |
Expiry timestamp (1 hour · 1 day · 1 week · 4 weeks — chosen by the creator) |
access_count |
Number of times the note was retrieved |
created_by |
Account reference when signed in; NULL otherwise |
For encrypted notes (the default) the encryption key is never transmitted to the server; it
is embedded solely in the URL fragment (#), which browsers do not include in
HTTP requests.
If the creator explicitly chooses the plain-text link option, the note is stored
without content encryption and is readable by the server and anyone holding the link
— the note editor states this prominently before such a link is created. HTTPS still
encrypts the connection between the browser and the server.
Purpose: Providing the note-sharing service.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interests. The legitimate interest is providing the note-sharing service as explicitly requested by the user. No account or contract is required; the user initiates the transaction voluntarily and the server processes only what is technically necessary to fulfil that specific request.
Retention: Each note is automatically deleted when its expiry timestamp is
reached. A background job (delete_expired_notes) runs every minute in
production. A note is also deleted immediately when it is accessed after its expiry time.
The maximum chosen lifetime is 4 weeks. Notes created while signed in are also deleted
when the creator's account is deleted. Deletion from the live database does not remove
copies a recipient has downloaded or copies in existing backups (see Section 7).
Images hosted elsewhere are never loaded. A note is Markdown, and Markdown
can reference an image by URL. Displaying such an image would make your browser contact
that third-party server, telling it your IP address, your browser version, and the moment
you opened the note. Notes therefore render a labelled placeholder in place of any image
hosted on another server, naming the host it would have contacted. Nothing is requested from
it. Images embedded directly in the note's text (data: URIs) contain their own
bytes, make no request, and are displayed normally.
3.6 Live Notes (Editable Share Links)
What: An editable link turns a note into a collaboratively editable document. The document is always encrypted in the browser; the server stores an encrypted snapshot plus a log of encrypted updates it relays between participants:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
id |
Randomly generated UUID identifying the live note |
snapshot / snapshot_iv |
AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the document state and its initialization vector |
| update log | AES-256-GCM ciphertext of each batch of edits, with an initialization vector, sequence identifier, and timestamp, kept until participants consolidate them into a new snapshot |
created_at / updated_at / expires_at |
Creation, latest snapshot update, and expiry timestamps (chosen lifetime: 1 hour · 1 day · 1 week · 4 weeks) |
snapshot_seq |
Sequence identifier of the last update included in the snapshot |
access_count |
Number of times the live page was opened |
created_by |
Account reference when signed in; NULL otherwise |
The decryption key is embedded solely in the URL fragment (#) and never
transmitted to the server: the server cannot read the document and cannot merge edits —
merging happens in participants' browsers. There is no plain-text variant of editable
links.
Access does not require an account: anyone with the complete editable link can read and edit the note. If the creator is signed in when the link is created, the server associates the live note with that account for export and account deletion. It does not maintain a separate account-based history of which participants made individual edits.
While a live note is open, each participant's browser holds a persistent connection (WebSocket) to the server over which encrypted edits and encrypted presence updates — cursor positions, selections, and a randomly generated per-session display name and colour — are relayed between participants. Presence data is encrypted under the same document key. It is briefly buffered for delivery through an in-memory Redis channel service, is not saved to the database, and expires from participants' views after a disconnect. If the connection cannot be established, the browser falls back to periodic polling over HTTPS (without presence).
Honest limitation: collaboration makes more metadata visible than a one-shot share. While a live note is open, the server necessarily observes when, how often, for how long, and from which IP address a document is read or edited, how large its ciphertext is, and — because relaying requires it — how many participants are connected to the same document at the same time. The content, cursor positions, and display names remain encrypted end-to-end at all times.
Purpose: Providing the collaborative note-editing service.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interests, as for shared notes: the user initiates the interaction voluntarily and the server processes only what is technically necessary to relay the encrypted document.
Retention: Each live note — including its update log — is automatically
deleted when its expiry timestamp is reached (background job
delete_expired_notes, every minute in production), or immediately when it is
opened after its expiry time. The maximum retention period is 4 weeks. Update-log entries
are additionally pruned earlier whenever participants consolidate them into a new
encrypted snapshot. Live notes created while signed in are also deleted with the creator's
account. Existing backups and participants' own copies are subject to the limits described
in Section 7.
3.7 Registered User Accounts
What: When a visitor creates an account, the server stores:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
user_id |
8-digit numeric identifier, randomly generated |
password_hash |
Argon2 hash of a client-derived authentication secret |
auth_salt |
Public KDF salt for the client-side auth secret derivation (Base64) |
vault_salt |
Public KDF salt for the client-side vault key derivation (Base64) |
created_at |
Account creation timestamp |
updated_at |
Timestamp of last account modification |
No name or e-mail address is required; the account uses a pseudonymous ID.
The user's account password is never transmitted to or stored by the server. The browser derives
a separate authentication secret (via PBKDF2-SHA256, 100,000 iterations, domain-separated)
from the password and the auth_salt; only this derived secret is sent during
sign-in. The server stores its Argon2 hash. Possession of the hash does not allow the server
to derive the vault key.
The auth_salt and vault_salt are public inputs published by the
/auth/salts/ endpoint. For unknown user IDs, deterministic decoy salts are
returned so that the endpoint is not an account-existence oracle.
Purpose: Providing authenticated access to the vault and associating password shares, shared notes, and live notes with an account for management, export, and account deletion.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR — processing is necessary for the performance of the service contract.
Retention: Account data is retained for as long as the account exists. Users may request deletion of their account (see Section 08). When an account is deleted, its password shares, shared notes, live notes and their update logs, password vault blob, note vault documents, and note vault index are cascade-deleted from the live database.
3.8 Encrypted Password Vault (ServiceData)
What: Authenticated users who save data to the password vault cause the
server to store a ServiceData record:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
user |
Foreign key to the User record |
encrypted_data |
AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the user's vault contents |
iv |
12-byte initialization vector for the encryption (binary) |
created_at · updated_at |
Timestamps |
The vault is encrypted with the vault key, which is derived entirely in the browser from the
account password and the vault_salt. Password vault keys are held per tab in
sessionStorage and checked against the account, session, and access deadline
before reuse (see Section 4). The vault key is never sent to the server, which stores only
opaque ciphertext of the vault contents.
Purpose: Persisting the user's vault across devices and sessions.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR — performance of the service contract.
Retention: As long as the account exists. Cascade-deleted with the account.
3.9 Rate-Limiting Counters
What: To prevent abuse, the service enforces per-IP rate limits on
sensitive endpoints, including password and note creation, retrieval, vault access,
updates, exports, and live-note connections. Limits vary by operation; for example,
password-share creation allows 60/h and note-share creation allows 30/h. Rate-limit
counters are keyed using the client IP address and stored in a shared in-memory cache
(Redis in production). The IP address used for rate limiting is derived from the
X-Forwarded-For header (resolved for the
configured number of trusted proxies).
Purpose: Abuse prevention and protection of service availability.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interests (service security and availability). The counters are ephemeral; they hold no content associated with a user's identity beyond the IP address and a hit count.
Retention: Counters expire automatically in accordance with the rate-limit window (minutes to hours). Live notes also use temporary per-document connection counters to limit concurrent connections; these expire after six hours without a new connection. These counters are separate from the server logs described in Section 3.1.
3.10 Encrypted Note Vault
What: Signed-in users can save individual notes and organise them into folders. The server stores an encrypted document for each note and a separate encrypted index for the vault:
| Data | Content |
|---|---|
| Vault note | Random UUID, owning account reference, AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the document, and initialization vector |
| Vault index | Owning account reference, AES-256-GCM ciphertext of note names, folders, folder assignments, and Trash state, and initialization vector |
| Document and index timestamps | Creation and last update times |
trashed_at |
Unencrypted timestamp recording when a note was moved to Trash; empty for active notes |
Note contents, names, and folder organisation are encrypted in the browser using the vault key derived from the account password and public vault salt. The server can see the owning account, number and size of stored documents, timestamps, and whether and when a note was trashed. It cannot read the encrypted content or folder names. Creating a share link from a vault note creates a separate shared or live note with its own expiry; deleting the original vault note does not delete that separate share.
Purpose: Saving, organising, synchronising, and restoring the user's notes.
Legal basis: Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR — performance of the service contract.
Retention: Active vault notes have no automatic expiry and remain until permanent deletion or account deletion. Notes moved to Trash can be restored for seven days, after which the scheduled cleanup deletes their database rows. Choosing permanent deletion removes a note earlier. Restoring a note clears its deletion timestamp. The encrypted index is retained until account deletion and updated by the browser as the vault changes. Existing backups are described in Section 7.
Cookies, Browser Storage and § 25 TDDDG
Under § 25(1) TDDDG, storing information on a user's device or accessing information already
stored requires the user's consent unless an exception applies. Under § 25(2) Nr. 2 TDDDG,
consent is not required if the storage or access is strictly necessary for
the provision of a digital service explicitly requested by the user. This also applies to
browser storage such as sessionStorage and localStorage.
proxima·red sets exactly two cookies:
| Cookie | Purpose | Necessity | Consent required? |
|---|---|---|---|
sessionid |
Authentication session | Strictly necessary | No |
csrftoken |
CSRF protection | Strictly necessary | No |
The tools also use browser storage for encryption keys needed to access requested content:
| Storage | Purpose and contents | Lifetime |
|---|---|---|
sessionStorage |
Vault encryption keys and account/session context; temporary password-share keys; live-note keys so reloading a tab preserves access | Scoped to the tab's browser session; vault keys are also checked against their access deadline and invalidated when sign-out or a session change is detected |
localStorage on the note origin |
Derived note-vault key with account/session context and an expiry time, for access across note tabs and browser restarts | Usable within the seven-day note access window, renewed by foreground note activity; stale or revoked copies are discarded when the application next checks them |
Vault access is checked with the server before a cached key is reused. Closed tabs or browser origins cannot be cleared remotely, so cached material can remain on the device until the site is next opened or browser storage is cleared. You can remove local keys by clearing the site's browser data. The application does not send the keys to the server. Browser storage supports the requested encrypted sharing and vault functions under § 25(2) Nr. 2 TDDDG; processing account-related vault data is based on Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR.
No marketing, analytics, profiling, or tracking cookies or browser-storage entries are set.
Third-Party Processors (Art. 28 GDPR)
| Processor | Role | Data involved | Safeguard |
|---|---|---|---|
|
netcup GmbH Emmy-Noether-Straße 10 76131 Karlsruhe Germany |
VPS infrastructure in Nuremberg, Germany | Connection and request metadata, server logs, account and session data, encrypted shares and vault data, and any notes explicitly shared as plain text | Data processing agreement (Auftragsverarbeitungsvertrag) under Art. 28 GDPR; processing on the controller's instructions. |
The controller administers the VPS and the application services running on it. Netcup provides the underlying hosting infrastructure. Information about Netcup is available in its privacy policy.
No other third-party processors receive personal data. No third-party scripts, fonts, analytics services, CDNs, or social media integrations are used.
International Data Transfers
The service and its databases are hosted on the Netcup VPS in Nuremberg, Germany, within the European Union. The controller does not transfer service data to recipients outside the European Economic Area as part of operating these tools.
Data Retention Summary
| Data | Retention period |
|---|---|
| Server access logs | No fixed automatic deletion period for application and web-server logs; removed through VPS log rotation or deletion. Netcup's separate logs for defending against attacks: up to 14 days (Section 3.1) |
| Session cookie / session record | Seven-day session lifetime, renewed by note activity or password verification; invalidated on sign-out |
| CSRF cookie | Up to 364 days from the last refresh |
| Anonymous password shares | Up to the chosen expiry (max 4 weeks); deleted automatically at expiry |
| Shared notes | Up to the chosen expiry (max 4 weeks); deleted automatically at expiry |
| Live notes (editable links) incl. update log | Up to the chosen expiry (max 4 weeks); deleted automatically at expiry |
| User account data | Until account deletion |
| Encrypted password vault blob | Until account deletion |
| Encrypted vault notes | Until permanent deletion or account deletion; trashed notes are deleted by cleanup after seven days |
| Encrypted note vault index | Until account deletion; updated by the browser as the vault changes |
| Encrypted live-note presence | Temporary relay buffers and participant memory; not saved to the database |
| Encryption keys in browser storage | Tab session or the note vault's seven-day access window; see Section 4 for renewal and local removal |
| Rate-limit counters | Minutes to hours (automatic expiry) |
The share, note, and account deletion periods above describe the live database. Database backups and Netcup VPS snapshots, when created, are separate copies. No fixed automatic deletion period is currently configured for these copies. Deleted records may remain in them until the backup or snapshot is deleted or replaced. Deleting a share also cannot remove copies saved by its recipients.
Your Rights
Under the GDPR you have the following rights. To exercise any of them, contact signal@proxima.red. A response will be provided within one month (Art. 12(3) GDPR).
| Right | Article | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Access | Art. 15 GDPR | Request confirmation of and access to personal data held about you. |
| Rectification | Art. 16 GDPR | Request correction of inaccurate or completion of incomplete data. |
| Erasure | Art. 17 GDPR | Request deletion of your account and all associated data. Note: encrypted vault data cannot be decrypted by the server; deletion removes the ciphertext. |
| Restriction of processing | Art. 18 GDPR | Request that processing be restricted under certain conditions. |
| Data portability | Art. 20 GDPR | Receive your personal data in a structured, machine-readable format where processing is automated and based on consent or contract. |
| Objection | Art. 21 GDPR | Object to processing based on legitimate interests (Art. 6(1)(f)). This applies to server log processing and rate-limiting. |
| Withdrawal of consent | Art. 7(3) GDPR | Not currently applicable (no processing relies on consent). |
Practical note on access and portability requests: Account data held by the server consists of a random 8-digit ID, an Argon2 hash, and two public KDF salts — none of which reveals the account password or vault contents (which remain encrypted). Authenticated users can export their data via the account page. The export is a single JSON file containing every row the server keys to the account: the account metadata, both tools' vaults, and the password shares, notes and live notes the account created. Ciphertext is included as stored — the server cannot decrypt any of it, and decryption happens in the browser. Anonymous shares and notes carry no link to an account and therefore do not appear.
Requests relating to application and web-server logs are handled by the controller. Where a request concerns infrastructure logs held by Netcup, the controller will involve Netcup as necessary.
Right to Lodge a Complaint
You have the right to lodge a complaint with a data protection supervisory authority (Art. 77 GDPR). The competent authority for the controller (located in Saxony, Germany) is:
Sächsischer Datenschutz- und Transparenzbeauftragter (SDTB)
Devrientstraße 5
01067 Dresden
Germany
https://www.sdtb.sachsen.de
You may also contact the federal authority:
Bundesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit (BfDI)
Graurheindorfer Str. 153
53117 Bonn
Germany
https://www.bfdi.bund.de
Changes to This Policy
This policy will be updated if processing activities change. The "Last updated" date at the top of this document reflects the date of the most recent revision. Continued use of the service after a material change constitutes acknowledgement of the updated policy.